Source List and Detailed Death Tolls for the Twentieth Century Hemoclysm

[The following information represents the intent, design and works of prominent world leaders, and their bankers and banks whose names are rarely mentioned, to, in the words of Maximus, "unleash Hell on earth." Jesus said, "You shall know the truth and the truth shall set you free." And, "The Kingdom of Heaven is within you." If I must die, I wish to die standing for what is holy, right and true. Love is liberty; hatred is certain death.]

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Elsewhere, I defined the Hemoclysm as that string of interconnected barbarities which have made the Twentieth Century so fascinating for historians and so miserable for real people. Here, I have listed the sources for determing the body count for the Big Four -- the First and Second World Wars, Communist China and the Soviet Union -- which together account for maybe ¾ of all deaths by atrocity in the 20th Century.


1. First World War (1914-18): 15 000 000 [make link]
* This is the only major bloodletting which has pretty much the same body count no matter which source I check: 8,500,000 military deaths. It all goes back to a report issued by the U.S. War Dept. in Feb. 1924, amended by the Statistical Services Center, Office of the Secretary of Defense on 7 Nov. 1957, which everyone ("everyone" = Brzezinski, Britannica, Norman Davies, Encarta, Gilbert, Hammond, Small & Singer, Wallechinsky) more or less agrees with. Among my major sources, only Eckhardt and Urlanis diverge from the mainstream. In The Defeat of Imperial Germany 1917-1918, Rod Paschall cites a study by Arthur Banks. I've also consulted John Ellis & Michael Cox, The World War I Databook ("E&C"):
o Austria-Hungary: 1,100,000 (Urlanis); 1,200,000 (everyone, Paschall); 2,300,000 (Eckhardt)
+ E&C cite two different tables in the Austrian Official History, giving total killed as either 1,016,200 k. or 539,630 k. Neither includes 478,000 who died as POWs.
o Belgium: 13,716 (Britannica, Compton's, Daivies, Hammond, Tucker); 38,000 (Urlanis); 87,500 (S&S -- although it seems to me that they have confused "Belg." with "Bulg."; see 2 lines down.); 88,000 (Eckhardt)
o Britain & Empire: 908,371 (everyone); 997,000 (Paschall)
+ Africans: 38,723 laborers and porters died in hospital in East Africa 1917-18 (E&C)
+ Australia: 53,560 KIA + 6,300 other deaths = 59,860 (E&C); 60,000 (Eckhardt; Urlanis); 61,720 (AWM)
+ Canada: 55,000 (Eckhardt); 61,000 (Urlanis); 58,990 KIA + 3,830 other deaths = 62,820 (E&C)
+ India: 25,000 (Eckhardt); 54,000 (Urlanis)
+ New Zealand: 16,000 (Eckhardt; Urlanis); 16,710 (E&C)
+ UK: 702,410 (E&C); 715,000 (Urlanis); 1,000,000 (Eckhardt)
+ South Africa: 7,000 (Urlanis); 7,120 (E&C: whites only)
o Bulgaria: 14,000 (S&S-c.f. Belgium); 28,000 (Eckhardt); 75,844 (Tucker); 87,500 (Britannica, Davies, Compton's); 88,000 (Urlanis); 90,000 (Hammond); 95,000 (Paschall); 77,450 KIA + >24,500 other deaths = 101,950 (E&C)
o France & Empire: 1,327,000 (Urlanis); 1,357,800 (everyone); 1,385,300 (E&C); 1,390,000 (Paschall); 1,630,000 (Eckhardt)
+ French Colonies: 58,000 (E&C); 114,000 (Urlanis)
o Germany: 1,773,700 (everyone); 1,850,000 (Paschall); 2,037,000 (E&C, Urlanis); 2,400,000 (Eckhardt)
+ Africans: 14,000 (E&C)
o Greece: 5,000 (everyone; Eckhardt, E&C); 26,000 (Urlanis)
o Italy: 460,000 (Paschall); 462,391 (Tucker); 462,400 (E&C); 578,000 (Urlanis); 600,000 (Hammond); 650,000 (Britannica, Davies, Compton's, S&S); 950,000 (Eckhardt)
o Japan: 300 (everyone)
o Montenegro: 3,000 (everyone)
o Portugal: 7,000 (Urlanis); 7,220 (E&C, incl. 5,550 in Africa); 7,222 (everyone); 13,000 (Eckhardt)
o Romania: 219,800 (E&C: incl. 70,500 who died as POWs); 250,000 (Urlanis); 340,000 (Paschall); 335,706 (everyone); 375,000 (Eckhardt)
o Russia: 1,700,000 (everyone, Paschall); 1,800,000 (E&C); 1,811,000 (Urlanis); 2,950,000 (Eckhardt)
o Serbia: 45,000 (Tucker, Hammond, Britannica, Compton's), 48,000 (S&S), 70,000 (Davies); 127,500 (E&C: incl. sickness); 128,000 (Eckhardt: "Yugoslavia"); 278,000 (Urlanis: "Serbia + Montenegro")
o Turkey: 236,000 (E&C); 325,000 (everyone); 350,000 (Paschall); 450,000 (Eckhardt); 804,000 (Urlanis)
o USA: 50,585 (Tucker, Hammond, Britannica); 51,822 (E&C); 53,407 (Compton's); 116,000 (Paschall); 53,402 KIA + 63,114 other deaths = 116,516 (DoD; 1991 Info. Please); 126,000 (S&S; Eckhardt)
o TOTAL: 8,364,712 (E&C); 8,500,000 (everyone); 8,513,000 (Paschall); 9,442,000 (Urlanis); 12,599,000 (Eckhardt)
* Individual Battles:
o 2nd Aisne
o 2nd Arras
o Belleau Wood
o Caporetto
o Frontiers, Battle of the
o Gallipoli
o Jutland
o Lemberg
o 1st Marne
o 2nd Marne
o Meuse-Argonne
o Passchendaele
o Somme
o Tannenburg
o Verdun
o 1st Ypres
* Civilian casualty estimates are spread wider, and are usually offered without source or detail. (Some of these civilian estimates may include all or part of the Russian Civil War and Armenian massacres -- it's difficult to decide where WW1 ends and these begin, or whether these are distinct and separate events at all)
o Brzezinski: 13,000,000 civilians
o Britannica: 13,000,000
o Encyclopedia Americana (2003), "Twentieth Century": 12.5M civilians
o Encarta: close to 10,000,000
o Hammond: 9,000,000
o Urlanis: 9,000,000 (based on increased mortality during the war years)
+ Russia: 1,500,000
+ Italy: 1,021,000
+ Austria-Hungary: 700,000
+ Germany: 692,000
+ France: 500,000
+ Serbia: 450,000
+ Romania: 430,000
+ Britain: 292,000
+ Greece: 150,000
+ Bulgaria: 100,000
+ Belgium: 92,000
+ Turkey: unknown
o MEDIAN: 6.6-9.0M
o Tucker (European Powers in the First World War -- the source of the data on my map): 6,642,633
+ Turkey: 2,150,000
+ Russia: 2,000,000
+ Germany: 760,000
+ Serbia: 650,000
+ Austria-Hungary: 300,000
+ Bulgaria: 275,000
+ Romania: 275,000
+ Greece: 132,000
+ France: 40,000
+ Britain: 30,633
+ Belgium: 30,000
o Dictionary of Military History (1994): 6,600,000
o Wallechinsky: 6,500,000
o Eckhardt: 6,493,000
+ Nation by nation, Eckhardt and Tucker agree -- with three exceptions:
# Russia: 3,000,000
# Turkey: 1,000,000
# UK: 31,000
+ (Eckhardt explicitly excludes the Armenian massacres and Russian Civil War from these numbers.)
o John Ellis & Michael Cox, The World War I Databook: 6,458,886
+ Turkey: 2,000,000 (mainly Armenian)
+ Russia: 2,000,000
+ Germany: 700,000
+ Serbia: 600,000
+ Romania: 265,000 to 500,000 [=ca. 382,500]
+ Austria-Hungary: 300,000
+ Bulgaria: 275,000
+ Greece: 130,000
+ France: 40,000
+ Belgium: 30,000
+ Britain: 1,386 (in air raids)
o Davies (Europe A History): 5,000,000
o ATROCITIES:
+ Belgian civilians massacred by Germans, Aug. 1914 (John Keegan, The First World War, 1998): 211 at Andenne, 384 at Tamines, 612 at Dinant.
+ McDougall [http://www.channel4.com/history/microsites/H/history/heads/footnotes/dirtyhands.html]
# Belgian civilians k. by German army: 5,500
# Lusitania sunk by Ger.: 1,200 k.
# Germans d. of starvation under wartime blockade: 763,000
# Armenians: 1,000,000+
2. Russian Civil War (1917-22): 9 000 000 [make link]
* Eckhardt: 500,000 civ. + 300,000 mil. = 800,000
* Readers Companion to Military History, Cowley and Parker, eds. (1996) [http://college.hmco.com/history/readerscomp/mil/html/mh_045400_russiancivil.htm]:
o Combat deaths: 825,000
o Ancillary deaths: 2,000,000
o TOTAL: 2,825,000
* Davies, Norman (Europe A History, 1998)
o Civil War and Volga Famine (1918-22): 3,000,000 to 5,000,000
* Brzezinski, Z:
o 6 to 8 million people died under Lenin from war, famine etc.
* Mastering Twentieth Century Russian History by Norman Lowe (2002)
o TOTAL: 7,000,000 to 10,000,000
o Red Army
+ Battle: 632,000
+ Disease: 581,000
o Whites: 1,290,000 battle + disease
o White Terror: "tens of thousands"
o Red Terror
+ Executed: 50-200,000
+ Died in prison or killed in revolts: 400,000
o Typhoid + typhus
+ 1919: 890,000
+ 1920: >1M
* Urlanis:
o Military deaths: 800,000
+ Battle deaths, all sides: 300,000
+ Dead of wounds: 50,000
+ Disease: 450,000
o Civilians: 8,000,000
o TOTAL: 8,800,000
* Dyadkin, I.G. (cited in Adler, N., Victims of Soviet Terror, 1993)
o 9 million unnatural deaths from terror, famine and disease, 1918-23
* Richard Pipes, A concise history of the Russian Revolution (1995): 9 million deaths, 1917-1922
o Famine: 5M
o Combat: 2M
+ Reds: 1M
+ Whites: 127,000
o Epidemics: 2M
o not incl.
+ Emigration: 2M
+ Birth deficit: 14M
* Rummel:
o Civil War (1917-22)
+ War: 1,410,000 (includes 500,000 civilian)
+ Famine: 5,000,000 (50% democidal)
+ Other democide: 784,000
+ Epidemics: 2,300,000
+ Total: 9,494,000
o Lenin's Regime (1917-24)
+ Rummel blames Lenin for a lifetime total of 4,017,000 democides.
* Figes, Orlando (A People's Tragedy: A History of the Russian Revolution, 1997)
o 10 million deaths from war, terror, famine and disease.
+ Including...
# Famine (1921-22): 5 million
# Killed in fighting, both military and civilian: 1M
# Jews killed in pogroms: 150,000
+ Not including...
# Demographic effects of a hugely reduced birth-rate: 10M
# Emmigration: 2M
* McEvedy, Colin (Atlas of World Population History, 1978)
o War deaths: 2M
o Other excess deaths: 14M
o Reduced births: 10M
o Emmigration: 2M
* MEDIAN: Of these ten estimates that claim to be complete, the median is 8.8M-9.0M.
* PARTIALS:
o Small & Singer (battle deaths, 1917-21)
+ Russian Civil War (Dec.1917-Oct.1920)
# Russians: 500,000
# Allied Intervention:
* Japan: 1,500
* UK: 350
* USA: 275
* France: 50
* Finland: 50
+ Russian Nationalities War (Dec.1917-Mar.1921)
# USSR: 50,000
o Bruce Lincoln, Red Victory: a History of the Russian Civil War 1918-1921
+ Death sentences by the Cheka: ca. 100,000
+ Pogroms: as many as one in 13 Jews k. out of 1.5M in Ukraine [i.e. ca. 115,000] (citing Heifetz)
o Nevins, citing Heifetz and the Red Cross: 120,000 Jews killed in 1919 pogroms [http://www.west.net/~jazz/felshtin/redcross.html]
o Richard Overy, Russia's War (1997): Cheka responsible for maybe 250,000+ violent deaths.
o Paul Johnson
+ 50,000 death sentences imposed by the Cheka by 12/20
+ 100,000 Jews killed in 1919
o Green, Barbara (in Rosenbaum, Is the Holocaust Unique?)
+ 4 to 5 million deaths in the famine of 1921-23
o Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace
+ North Russia: 244 USAns d. incl. 144 k.battle
+ Siberia: 160 USAns KIA + 168 other d.
+ [US Total: 304 KIA + 268 other = 572 d.]
+ Czech Legion: 13,000 dead.
3. Soviet Union, Stalin's regime (1924-53): 20 000 000 [make link]
* There are basically two schools of thought when it comes to the number who died at Stalin's hands. There's the "Why doesn't anyone realize that communism is the absolutely worst thing ever to hit the human race, without exception, even worse than both world wars, the slave trade and bubonic plague all put together?" school, and there's the "Come on, stop exaggerating. The truth is horrifying enough without you pulling numbers out of thin air" school. The two schools are generally associated with the right and left wings of the political spectrum, and they often accuse each other of being blinded by prejudice, stubbornly refusing to admit the truth, and maybe even having a hidden agenda. Also, both sides claim that recent access to former Soviet archives has proven that their side is right.
* Here are a few illustrative estimates from the Big Numbers school:
o Adler, N., Victims of Soviet Terror, 1993 cites these:
+ Chistyakovoy, V. (Neva, no.10): 20 million killed during the 1930s.
+ Dyadkin, I.G. (Demograficheskaya statistika neyestestvennoy smertnosti v SSSR 1918-1956 ): 56 to 62 million "unnatural deaths" for the USSR overall, with 34 to 49 million under Stalin.
+ Gold, John.: 50-60 million.
o Davies, Norman (Europe A History, 1998): c. 50 million killed 1924-53, excluding WW2 war losses. This would divide (more or less) into 33M pre-war and 17M after 1939.
o Rummel, 1990: 61,911,000 democides in the USSR 1917-87, of which 51,755,000 occurred during the Stalin years. This divides up into:
+ 1923-29: 2,200,000 (plus 1M non-democidal famine deaths)
+ 1929-39: 15,785,000 (plus 2M non-democidal famine)
+ 1939-45: 18,157,000
+ 1946-54: 15,613,000 (plus 333,000 non-democidal famine)
+ TOTAL: 51,755,000 democides and 3,333,000 non-demo. famine
o William Cockerham, Health and Social Change in Russia and Eastern Europe: 50M+
o Wallechinsky: 13M (1930-32) + 7M (1934-38)
+ Cited by Wallechinsky:
# Medvedev, Roy (Let History Judge): 40 million.
# Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr: 60 million.
o MEDIAN: 51 million for the entire Stalin Era; 20M during the 1930s.
* And from the Lower Numbers school:
o Nove, Alec ("Victims of Stalinism: How Many?" in J. Arch Getty (ed.) Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives, 1993): 9,500,000 "surplus deaths" during the 1930s.
o Cited in Nove:
+ Maksudov, S. (Poteri naseleniya SSSR, 1989): 9.8 million abnormal deaths between 1926 and 1937.
+ Tsaplin, V.V. ("Statistika zherty naseleniya v 30e gody" 1989): 6,600,000 deaths (hunger, camps and prisons) between the 1926 and 1937 censuses.
+ Dugin, A. ("Stalinizm: legendy i fakty" 1989): 642,980 counterrevolutionaries shot 1921-53.
+ Muskovsky Novosti (4 March 1990): 786,098 state prisoners shot, 1931-53.
o Gordon, A. (What Happened in That Time?, 1989, cited in Adler, N., Victims of Soviet Terror, 1993): 8-9 million during the 1930s.
o Ponton, G. (The Soviet Era, 1994): cites an 1990 article by Milne, et al., that excess deaths 1926-39 were likely 3.5 million and at most 8 million.
o MEDIAN: 8.5 Million during the 1930s.
* As you can see, there's no easy compromise between the two schools. The Big Numbers are so high that picking the midpoint between the two schools would still give us a Big Number. It may appear to be a rather pointless argument -- whether it's fifteen or fifty million, it's still a huge number of killings -- but keep in mind that the population of the Soviet Union was 164 million in 1937, so the upper estimates accuse Stalin of killing nearly 1 out of every 3 of his people, an extremely Polpotian level of savagery. The lower numbers, on the other hand, leave Stalin with plenty of people still alive to fight off the German invasion.
* [Letter]
* Although it's too early to be taking sides with absolute certainty, a consensus seems to be forming around a death toll of 20 million. This would adequately account for all documented nastiness without straining credulity:
o In The Great Terror (1969), Robert Conquest suggested that the overall death toll was 20 million at minimum -- and very likely 50% higher, or 30 million. This would divide roughly as follows: 7M in 1930-36; 3M in 1937-38; 10M in 1939-53. By the time he wrote The Great Terror: A Re-assessment (1992), Conquest was much more confident that 20 million was the likeliest death toll.
o Britannica, "Stalinism": 20M died in camps, of famine, executions, etc., citing Medvedev
o Brzezinski: 20-25 million, dividing roughly as follows: 7M destroying the peasantry; 12M in labor camps; 1M excuted during and after WW2.
o Daniel Chirot:
+ "Lowest credible" estimate: 20M
+ "Highest": 40M
+ Citing:
# Conquest: 20M
# Antonov-Ovseyenko: 30M
# Medvedev: 40M
o Courtois, Stephane, Black Book of Communism (Le Livre Noir du Communism): 20M for the whole history of Soviet Union, 1917-91.
+ Essay by Nicolas Werth: 15M
+ [Ironic observation: The Black Book of Communism seems to vote for Hitler as the answer to the question of who's worse, Hitler (25M) or Stalin (20M).]
o John Heidenrich, How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars, and the Concerned Citizen (2001): 20M, incl.
+ Kulaks: 7M
+ Gulag: 12M
+ Purge: 1.2M (minus 50,000 survivors)
o Adam Hochschild, The Unquiet Ghost: Russians Remember Stalin: directly responsible for 20 million deaths.
o Tina Rosenberg, The Haunted Land: Facing Europes Ghosts After Communism (1995): upwards of 25M
o Time Magazine (13 April 1998): 15-20 million.
* AVERAGE: Of the 17 estimates of the total number of victims of Stalin, the median is 30 million.
* Individual Gulags etc.
o Kolyma
o Kuropaty
o Vorkuta
o Bykivnia
* Famine, 1926-38
o Richard Overy, Russia's War (1997): 4.2M in Ukraine + 1.7M in Kazakhstan
o Green, Barbara ("Stalinist Terror and the Question of Genocide: the Great Famine" in Rosenbaum, Is the Holocaust Unique?) cites these sources for the number who died in the famine:
+ Nove: 3.1-3.2M in Ukraine, 1933
+ Maksudov: 4.4M in Ukraine, 1927-38
+ Mace: 5-7M in Ukraine
+ Osokin: 3.35M in USSR, 1933
+ Wheatcraft: 4-5M in USSR, 1932-33
+ Conquest:
# Total, USSR, 1926-37: 11M
# 1932-33: 7M
# Ukraine: 5M
4. Second World War (1937-45): 55 000 000 [make link]
* Total:
o It's the most intensively studied event of the 20th Century, so the margin of error is not quite a wide here as for most of the other wars and oppressions on this page. Most historians agree that the death toll was about 50 million (including wartime atrocities). If you don't believe me, here's just a sampling of the books I have on hand:
+ Haywood: Atlas of World History (1997): 50M
+ Keegan, J., The Second World War (1989): 50M
+ Messenger, The Chronological Atlas of World War Two (1989): 50M
+ The Times Concise Atlas of World History (1988): 50M
+ J.M. Roberts, Twentieth Century (1999): >50M
+ Urlanis: 50M
# Soldiers: 22.0M
# Civilians
* In camps, from Fascist terror: 12.0M
* From hostilites, blockade, epidemics, hunger: 14.5M
* From bombing: 1.5M
+ Dictionary of Military History (1994): 41M
+ Wallechinsky: 40-55M
+ Kinder, The Anchor Atlas of World History (1978): 55M
+ Hammond: 55M
+ Guiness World Records: 56.4M [http://www.guinnessworldrecords.com/index.asp?id=46252]
+ Sivard, Ruth Leger, World Military and Social Expenditures 1986 (11th ed.): 38,351,000 (1939-45), not incl. 1.8M in Sino-Japanese War (1937-41)
+ Brzezinski:
# Military: 19M
# Civilians, "actual byproduct of hostilities": 20M
# Civilians, Sino-Japanese War: 15M
# Hitler's murders: 17M
# TOTAL: 71M
+ Rummel:
# European War Dead (1939-45): 28,736,000
# Sino-Japanese War Dead (1937-45): 7,140,000
# War-related Democides
* Hitler: 20,946,000
* Stalin: 13,053,000
* Japanese: 5,964,000
* Chinese Nationalist: 5,907,000
* Allied Bombing: 796,000
* Croatian: 655,000
* Tito: 600,000
* Romanian domestic democide: 484,000
* Chinese Communist: 250,000
* Hungarian democide in Yugoslavia: 78,000
* [TOTAL: 48,733,000]
# [TOTAL (1937-45): 84,609,000]
+ AVERAGE
# The MEDIAN of these estimates is 50M.
# If we add up the country-by-country medians (of total death tolls) we get:
* LEVEL 1: 47.35M
o USSR: 20.0M
o China: 10.45M
o Poland: 5.8M
o Germany: 5.5M
o India: 2.15M
o Japan: 1.9M
o Yugoslavia: 1.55M
* LEVEL 2: ca. 3.8M
* LEVEL 3: ca. 0.25M
* TOTAL: 51.4M
# The country-by-country medians for military personnel killed in the war are:
* USSR: 10.0M
* Germany: 3.5M
* China: 2.05M
* Japan: 1.5M
* USA: 0.4M
* Romania: 0.3M
* Yugoslavia: 0.3M
* UK: 0.28M
* Italy: 0.23M
* France: 0.21M
* Hungary: 0.14M
* Poland: 0.125M
* TOTAL: 19.0M
* Who to Blame:
o Most history books break their WW2 numbers down according to whether the dead are military or civilian and which country they came from. Since I've done that elsewhere, let's try to break it down by guilt. Here are various estimates by various experts of the number of superfluous, non-military deaths during the Second World War.
1. Hitler [make link]:
* Extermination of the Jews:
o Reitlinger, Gerald, The Final Solution (1953): between 4,194,200 and 4,851,200 (this number is accepted by Kinder, The Anchor Atlas of World History (1978))
o Brzezinski: 5,000,000
o Chirot: 5,100,000
+ 3,000,000 in death camps.
+ 1,300,000 massacred.
+ 800,000 by dis./maln. in ghettos
o Rummel: 5,291,000
o Grenville: 5-6M
o Davies, Europe A History (1998): avg. c. 5,571,300 (puts the minimum at 4,871,000 and the maximum at 6,271,500.)
o MEDIAN: ca. 5.6M
o Nuremberg indictment: 5,700,000 (accepted by Britannica)
o Gutman, Encyclopedia of the Holocaust (1990): 5,596,029 to 5,860,129
o P. Johnson: 5,800,000
o Wallechinsky: "nearly" 6,000,000
o Urlanis: 6M
* Country-by-country
* Individual Camps, Massacres etc.
o Auschwitz
o Babi Yar
o Belzec
o Chelmno
o Majdanek
o Mauthausen
o Odessa
o Sobibor
o Treblinka
* Soviet Prisoners of War killed:
o Urlanis: 3,912,000
o 12 March 1995 Times-Picayune: nearly 3.5M
o Our Times: 3,300,000
o Rummel: 3,100,000
o MEDIAN: 3.0-3.1M
o Mazower, Dark Continent: 3M
o Harper Collins Atlas of the Second World War: 3,000,000
o Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (1960): 2,000,000 dead and 1,000,000 never accounted for, presumed dead.
o Britannica: 2,600,000
* Roma (Gypsies):
o Hammond: 250,000.
o Rummel: 258,000.
o Mazower, Dark Continent: 200,000-500,000.
o Porter: 500,000
o Brzezinski: 800,000
o Ian Hancock, "Responses to the Romani Holocaust" in Is the Holocaust Unique? (A. Rosenbaum, ed.) cites these:
+ US Holocaust Memorial Museum: 250,000
+ "several published estimates": >1,000,000
+ Pauwels and Bergier: 750,000
+ Financial Times (London): 500-750,000 in death camps and another million shot outside.
* Homosexuals:
o Chirot: 10-15,000
o Rummel: 220,000
* Euthanasia of Handicapped:
o Hugh G. Gallagher: 275,000, citing Breggin (in Century of Genocide, Samuel Totten, ed., (1997))
o Johnson: 70,000 insane and incurable Germans k.
o US Holocaust Memorial Museum, Historical Atlas of the Holocaust: 70,000 k.in initial phase, 1939-41. 275,000 total k, acc. to Nuremburg Tribunal.
* Air Raids
o Richard Overy, Russia's War (1997): "an estimated 500,000 Soviet citizens died from German bomb attacks."
o Belgrade
o London
o Stalingrad
* Victims of Wehrmacht:
o Acc2 historical exhibit curated by Hannes Heer: The common soldiers of the Wehrmacht murdered 1.5M Jews, 3.3M POWs + 5-7M non-Jewish civilians (17 May 1995 Agence France Presse; 22 Feb. 1997 AP)
* [Let's make a rough calcultion of the number of Soviet civilians who were victims of excessive German brutality. In the Italian Campaign, for example, where the rules of civilized warfare were generally obeyed, there were some 90T civilians and 125T soldiers killed. The same ratio applied to the ca. 11M soldiers killed in battle in Russia would indicate that some 7.9M Russian civilians would have died if the laws of war had been kept in place, instead of the ca. 17M that did die. The difference of 9 million dead civilians is the cost of the added brutality.]
* General political prisoners:
o Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century (1998): over one million died in concentration camps, not counting those deliberately targeted for extermination.
o Rosenburg, The Haunted Land: 26,000 political death sentences passed by German courts.
* HITLER TOTAL:
o Courtois: 25,000,000
o Rummel: 20,946,000 democides
o Brzezinski: 17,000,000
o Urlanis: 15-16,000,000 (11-12M civilians + 3.9M POWs)
o MEDIAN: ca. 15.5M
o Our Times: 13,000,000 (6M Jews + 7M others)
o Compton's: 12,000,000
o Grenville: 10,000,000, including 2M children.
o NOTE: These numbers only include outright murders, but keep in mind that some 28M civilians and 14M soldiers died in the European War. That's 42,000,000 deaths which can probably be blamed on Hitler to one extent or another.
2. Japanese [make link]:
* China and Korea
o Nanking Massacre, 13 Dec. 1937-Feb. 38:
+ Spence, The Search for Modern China: 42,000
+ Gilbert: >200,000 civilians and 90,000 POWs
+ Dict.Wars: 200,000
+ Rummel: 200,000
+ P. Johnson: 200-300,000
+ 27 Aug 2001 Newsweek, quoting Japanese textbook: "The number of dead is said to be over 100,000 and it is estimated to be over 300,000 in China."
+ Palmowski, Dictionary of 20th Century World History: "perhaps as many as" 400,000
+ Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking (1997) cites these:
# Liu Fang-chu: 430,000
# James Yin & Shi Young: 400,000
# Sun Zhaiwei: 377,400 corpses disposed of
# Wu Tien-wei: 340,000
# District Court of Nanking: 300,000
# International Military Tribunal of the Far East: 260,000
# Fujiwara Akira: 200,000
# John Rabe: 50,000-60,000
# Hata Ikuhiko: 38,000-42,000
+ [Median: 260,000]
o Unit 731, Manchukuo (bio-warfare center: 1937-45)
+ Discovery Channel: "as many as 200,000 people — Chinese soldiers, private citizens and prisoners of war — had died" [http://dsc.discovery.com/anthology/spotlight/bioterror/history/history2.html]
+ Global Security: Up to 3,000 died in this facility. Perhaps as many 200,000 Chinese died from germ war campaign in Yunnan Province, Ningbo, and Changde. [http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/japan/bw.htm]
o Bombing: 71,105 Chinese k. by Japanese bombing (Clodfelter)
* South East Asia and East Indies
o Bataan Death March, 1942
o Burma-Siam Railroad, worker deaths (1941-43)
+ Johnson: 16,000 POWs
+ Our Times, also Gilbert: 50,000 Burmese civilians and 16,000 Allied POWs
+ Grenville: 100,000 Asians and 16,000 Europeans
+ 7 February 2002 AP: 50,000 Asian laborers and 16,000 Allied POWs
o Manila Massacre, 1944-45
o East Timor
+ James Dunn, in Century of Genocide, Samuel Totten, ed., (1997)): 70,000 died under Japanese occupation
+ 19 May 2002 San Gabriel Valley Tribune: "January 1942: Japan occupies the entire island. With support from the local people, Australian commandos in East Timor battle Japan. Japanese reprisals kill 60,000 civilians 13 percent of East Timor's population."
o Dutch East Indies: 25,000 Dutch d. out of 140,000 imprisoned (3 Feb. 1998 Agence France Presse)
o Singapore, citizens (mostly Chinese) massacred, 1942
+ Japan Economic Newswire/Kyodo News Service
# 16 June 2004: 50,000-100,000
# 13 Aug. 1984: Report by Allies after WW2 est. 5,000 k. Families claim 40,000-50,000
+ Associated Press
# 30 July 1995: "The Japanese military said 6,000 were killed. Singaporeans put the death toll at 50,000."
# 12 Sept 1995: 30,000-40,000
+ National Archives of Singapore: 8,600 reported. "[T]here were many more." [http://www.s1942.org.sg/dir_defence7.htm]
+ Grenville: 5,000
+ LC: 5,000-25,000 [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/sgtoc.html]
+ [ANALYSIS: There's no consensus. I have 5 low estimates ranging from 5,000-8,600. I have 5 high estimates ranging from 25,000-100,000. Three sources hedge their bets by offering both a low estimate and a high estimate. Two give a low estimate exclusively, and two give a high estimate exclusively.]
* Rummel blames the Japanese for 5,964,000 democides
o POWs: 539,000 (400,000 Chinese)
o Forced Labor: 1,010,000 (142,000 Chinese)
o Massacres: 3,608,000 (2,850,000 Chinese)
o Bombing/CB warfare: 558,000 (all Chinese)
o Imposed Famine: 250,000 (none in China)
o Rummel also estimates that General/Prime Minister Tojo Hideki was responsible for a lifetime total of 3,990,000 democides.
* Some guy on Internet [http://www.jca.apc.org/JWRC/exhibit/Index.HTM]
o Nanjing Massacre: 155,337 dead bodies
+ Chinese official estimate: >300,000
+ Japanese scholars:100-200,000
o Datong Coal Mine, China: 60,000 slave laborers killed
o Forced labor camps in Japan: 6,830 imported workers died
o Singapore: 5,000 Chinese k -- another estimate: 50,000-60,000 k.
o Burma-Siam RR: 12,400 POWs + 42,000 Asian wkrs
* My estimate is that 11M civilians and 4.5M soldiers died in the Asian/Pacific War. That's 15,500,000 deaths which can probably be blamed on the Japanese to one extent or another.
3. Stalin [make link]:
* Deported nationalities:
o Aleksandr Nekrich, The Punished Peoples (1978): Net population losses, 1939-59, after allowance for wartime losses.
+ Chechens: 590,000
+ Kalmyks: 142,000
+ Ingush: 128,000
+ Karachai: 124,000
+ Balkars: 64,000
+ [TOTAL: 1,048,000]
o Kenneth Christie, Historical Injustice and Democratic Transition in Eastern Asia and Northern Europe: Ghosts at the Table of Democracy (2002)
+ Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonians (1940-41): 85,000 deported, of which 55,000 killed or died
+ Baltics executed during reconquest (1944-45): 30,000
+ Postwar partisan war
# Lithuanians: 40-50,000 k.
# Latvian: 25,000
# Estonians: 15,000
+ [TOTAL: 170,000 ± 5,000]
o Richard Overy, Russia's War (1997)
+ citing Rummel: 530,000 Chechens and other Black Sea/Caucasus minorities d.
+ citing NKVD archives: 231,000 deaths, 1943-49
o Harff and Gurr:
+ Chechens, Ingushi, Karachai, Balkars, Kalmyks: 230,000 d. (1943-57)
+ Meskhierians, Crimean Tatars: 57,000 - 175,000 d. (1944-68)
o Davies: 1,000,000 Volga Germans, Chechens, Ingush, Crimean Tatars, etc.
o NewsHour: some 200,000 Chechens died during the exile [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe/chechnya/history.html]
* Enemy POWs never returned:
o Brzezinski: 1,000,000 total d. (incl. 357,000 Germans, 140,000 Poles)
o Davies: 1,000,000 d.
o Richard Overy, Russia's War (1997): official figures released under glasnost
+ Germans: 2,388,000 POWs taken, of which 356,000 died
+ Hungarians, Romanians, etc.: 1,097,000 taken, of which 162,000 died
+ Japanese: 600,000 taken, of which 61,855 died
+ [Total: 4,085,000 taken, of which ca. 580,000 died]
o Katyn Massacre (April-May 1940):
+ Dictionary of 20C World History: 14,000 Polish officers systematically killed. 4,500 bodies discovered by Germans.
+ 30 July 2000 Sunday Telegraph [London]: 15,000 k.
+ Paul Johnson: 15,000 -- a third at Katyn, the rest in Sov. conc. camps.
+ Gilbert: 15,000 Polish POWs sent to 3 camps - Starobelsk, Kozelsk, Ostashkov - all killed. 4,400 from Kozelsk killed at Katyn.
* Returning Soviet POWs killed after the war:
o Harff and Gurr: 500,000 - 1,100,000 repatriated Soviet nationals killed (1943-47)
o Harper Collins: 1,000,000 POWs
o Davies: 5-6M deaths, screening of repatriates and inhabitants of ex-occupied territory
* Soviet soldiers executed:
o Richard Overy, Russia's War (1997)
+ "latest Russian estimates put the figure as high as 158,000 sentenced to be shot."
+ "442,000 were forced to serve in penal batallions." [These were assigned suicidally dangerous tasks, and the only way out was death or wounds, so figure maybe half dead, half crippled.]
* Gulag during the war years:
o Richard Overy, Russia's War (1997): 2.4M sent to Gulag; 1.9M freed. "Official figures show 621,000 deaths in the Gulag" during WW2
* Total killed by Stalin during the war years:
o Davies: 16-17,000,000 non-war-dead
o Rummel: 18,157,000 democides
o NOTE: Numbers this high are hard to reconcile with the common estimates of 7 million Soviet civilian deaths during WW2. Even if we go with larger, more recent estimates of 17M civilian deaths, these number proposed by Rummel and Davies would leave no room for murders at German hands and deaths as a simple by-product of war.
o My Very Rough Estimate (based largely, but not entirely, on Overy, who seems well-informed and sensible.) In tenths of millions.
+ Axis POWs: 0.6M
+ Soviet Soldiers during war: 0.4M
+ Gulag: 0.6M
+ Black Sea/Caucasus Minorities: 0.2M
+ Baltic Minorities: 0.2M
+ Repatriated Soviets after the war: 1.0M
+ Germans who died fleeing the advancing Red Army: 1.0M
+ TOTAL: 4.0M
4. Anglo-American Allies [make link]:
* Bombing of Germany: >305,000 (1945 US Strategic Bombing Survey); 400,000 (Hammond); 410,000 (Rummel, 100% democidal); 499,750 (Clodfelter); 593,000 (Keegan; also Grenville citing "official Germany"); 600,000 (P. Johnson)
* Bombing of Japan:
o Conventional: 260,000 (Clodfelter (citing an Official US est.); Keegan; P. Johnson); 299,484 (Clodfelter, citing Japanese source)
o Nuclear: 103,000 died outright (Keegan); 130,000 outright (Messenger);120,000 outright, 140,000 later (Our Times); 175,000 outright, 100,000 later (P. Johnson)
o Total: 330,000 (1945 US Strategic Bombing Survey); 363,000 (Keegan, not including post-war radiation sickness); 374,000 (Rummel, incl. 337,000 democidal); 435,000 (P. Johnson); 500,000 (Harper Collins Atlas of the Second World War)
* Bombing of Romania & Hungary: 50,000 (Rummel)
* Individual air raids
o Berlin
o Dresden
o Hamburg
o Hiroshima
o Nagasaki
o Tokyo
o Yokahama: 5,000 (1945 US Strategic Bombing Survey)
* Mistreatment of Axis POWs [I myself don't find these accusations credible, but FWIW, here they are.]
o James Bacque, Other Losses (1989) made the first accusation that Americans deliberately starved German POWs, killing about a million.
+ Bacque [http://www.corax.org/revisionism/misc/970920bacques.html]
o Bacque's 2nd book, Crimes & Mercies, expands the body count to 9.3-13.7M Germans killed by the Allies after the end of the war, incl. some 2.1-6.0M civilians who died being expelled from the East. [http://codoh.com/review/revcrimes.html]
o Stephen Ambrose dismisses these claims as sloppy research. He explains that the total number of German POWs who died from all causes in US hands was 56,000 out of some 5M held. [see also http://www.nizkor.org/ftp.cgi?people/b/bacque.james/] (56,000 might seem like a lot, but this would include those who were captured wounded.)
o The 1956 Maschke Commission counted 4,537 deaths. [see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rheinwiesenlager or http://www.cyberussr.com/hcunn/for/us-germany-pow.html]
o [Letter]
5. Mussolini (r. 1922-1943)
* Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century (1998): total of 29 death sentences passed on political prisoners before 1939.
* Rummel, democides by Fascist govt. of Italy:
o Ethiopia and Libya: 200,000 [before WW2]
o Yugoslavia: 15,000
o Greeks: 9,000
o Italians, domestically: 250
o TOTAL: 224,250
6. Yugoslavia:
* 2 March 1999 Agence France Presse
o Number killed in Croatian-run death camp at Jasenovac
+ Acc2 Croatian press: 85,000
+ Official Yugoslav estimate: 700,000
+ Simon Wiesenthal Centre: 500,000
* Alex Dragnic, Serbs & Croats (1992)
o k. by Ustase
+ Serbs: est. range 300,000 to 1,000,000, but 500-700,000 is "generally accepted"
+ Jews: 50,000
+ Gypsies: 20,000
o Massacre by Germans, Oct. 1941: 4-7,000
* John Lampe, Yugoslavia as History (1995)
o 300,000 Serbs k. by Ustasha
o 26,000 Jews k. by Ustasha
o 9,000 Slovenes executed by Italians, summer 1941
o Killed by Tito, 1945-46: 100,000
* Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: a Short History (1994)
o Muslims k. by Chetniks in Foca-Cajnice:
+ Aug. 1942: 2,000
+ Feb. 1943: 9,000
o Killed by Tito, 1945-46: 250,000 in shootings, camps and marches.
* Mazower, Dark Continent
o Serbs k. by Ustase: at least 334,000.
o Collaborators k. by Tito, postwar: up to 60,000
* 9 July 1990 NY Times
o Communist partisans shot 70-100,000 without trial within weeks of the war's end.
o Anti-Communist emigres claim ca. 500,000 killed ("... exaggerations, said Darko Bekic, a historian in Zagreb...")
o "Total of 1,700,000 Yugoslavs were killed, both in combat and in atrocities and reprisals by and against civilians"
* Rummel, democides by perpetrator:
o Axis occupying nations: 718,000
o Chetnik partisans: 100,000
o Communists: 100,000 as partisans, 500,000 shortly after coming to power
o Ustashi government of Croatia: 655,000
o TOTAL: 2,073,000 democides (also 555,000 battle deaths, for a grand total of 2,628,000)
* Fred Singleton, Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia (1976)
o 350,000 Serbs k. by Ustasha
* Marcus Tanner, Croatia: a Nation Forged in War
o Bleiburg massacre: est. range from 30,000 to 200,000 returning POWs k. by Communists (The upper number being favored by Croat nationalists)
o Ustashe camps
+ acc2 Communist govt: 600,000 k. in Jasenovas
+ acc2 Banac 120,000 k. in all camps
+ acc2 "others": 80,000 k. in all camps
+ acc2 Pres. Tudjman: 60,000 k. in all camps
o Total war deaths (according to one study)
+ Serbs: 487,000
# incl. 215,000 in Nazi and Ustase camps
+ Croats: 207,000
+ Muslims: 86,000
+ Jews: 60,000
+ TOTAL: 947,000
* Johan Wüscht, Population Losses in Yugoslavia during World War Two (1963), estimates a total population shortfall of 2,210,000 in the 1948 census. After accounting for emmigration (700,000) and a drop in births (423,000), he reckons the total number of deaths caused by the war and its aftermath to be 1,100,000. He also points out that adding up all the accusations of atrocities commited during the war far exceeds this calculated number of deaths, so one of them is wrong.
* ANALYSIS: Among those events with several estimates, the medians are ...
o Serbs k. by Ustashe: 275,000
o Postwar executions by Communists (and related deaths): 175,000
o Jasenovac
7. Romania:
* Rummel: 484,000 democides under kings Carol & Michael (1938-48) incl. 302,000 Jews.
* Robert Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts (1993): 185,000 Jews from Bessarabia and Moldovia murdered in "the only non-German-run extermination camp in Europe".
8. France:
* Collaborators killed after liberation:
o Grenville: 10,000
o Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: 9-10,000
o Our Times: 9,000 summarily, 700 after trial.
o David Drake, Intellectuals and Politics in Post-War France: 10,000 summary executions and 791 legal executions.
9. Other Western Nations, postwar purges:
* Mark Mazower, Dark Continent
o Italy: 10,000-15,000
o Netherlands: 40 executions
o Norway: 25 executions
5. Post-War Expulsion of Germans from East Europe (1945-47): 2 100 000 [make link]
* Died being expelled from Poland:
o Rummel: 1,585,000
o Keegan, John, The Second World War (1989): 1,250,000
o Kurt Glaser and Stephan Possony, Victims of Politics (1979): 1,225,000
* Died, from Czechoslovakia:
o Rummel: 197,000
o Martin Sorge, The Other Price of Hitler's War (1986): 241,000 Sudeten Germans
o Keegan: 250,000
o Glaser & Possony: 267,000
* TOTAL:
o Kinder, Anchor Atlas of World History: 3,000,000
o Britannica: 2,384,000 (This covers the years 1944-46, and it includes Germans who died fleeing while the war was still raging.)
o Glaser & Possony: 2,111,000 (This includes 619,000 from "elsewhere" not listed above)
o Keegan: 2,100,000 (This includes 600,000 from "elsewhere" not listed above; it does not include some 1,000,000 Germans who (by Keegan's estimate) died fleeing while the war was still raging.)
o Rummel: 1,782,000
6. Chinese Civil War (1945-49): 2 500 000 [make link]
* Bercovitch & Jackson: 100,000
* Dan Smith: 1,000,000
* Eckhardt: 1,000,000 from all causes
* Small & Singer: 1,000,000 battle deaths
* Wallechinsky: 1,200,000 battle deaths
* Walker, Robert L., The Human Cost of Communism in China (1971): 1,250,000
* Gilbert, citing Ho Ping-ti: 2,000,000 to 3,000,000 total deaths
* Our Times: 3,000,000
* Rummel:
o War Dead: 1,201,000
o Democide by Guomindang: 2,645,000
o Democide by Communists: 2,323,000
o Famine: 25,000
o TOTAL: 6,194,000
7. People's Republic of China, Mao Zedong's regime (1949-1975): 40 000 000 [make link]
* Agence France Press (25 Sept. 1999) citing at length from Courtois, Stephane, Le Livre Noir du Communism:
o Rural purges, 1946-49: 2-5M deaths
o Urban purges, 1950-57: 1M
o Great Leap Forward: 20-43M
o Cultural Revolution: 2-7M
o Labor Camps: 20M
o Tibet: 0.6-1.2M
o TOTAL: 44.5 to 72M
* Jasper Becker, Hungry Ghosts : Mao's Secret Famine (1996)
o Estimates of the death toll from the Great Leap Forward, 1959-61:
+ Judith Banister, China's Changing Population (1984): 30M excess deaths (acc2 Becker: "the most reliable estimate we have")
+ Wang Weizhi, Contemporary Chinese Population (1988): 19.5M deaths
+ Jin Hui (1993): 40M population loss due to "abnormal deaths and reduced births"
+ Chen Yizi of the System Reform Inst.: 43-46M deaths
* Brzezinski:
o Forcible collectivization: 27 million peasants
o Cultural Revolution: 1-2 million
o TOTAL: 29 million deaths under Mao
* Daniel Chirot:
o Land reform, 1949-56
+ According to Zhou Enlai: 830,000
+ According to Mao Zedong: 2-3M
o Great Leap Forward: 20-40 million deaths.
o Cultural Revolution: 1-20 million
* Jung Chang, Mao: the Unknown Story (2005)
o Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries, 1950-51: 3M by execution, mob or suicide
o Three-Anti Campaign, 1952-53: 200,000-300,000 suicides
o Great Leap Forward, 1958-61: 38M of starvation and overwork
o Cultural Revolution, 1966-76: > 3M died violent deaths
o Laogai camp deaths, 1949-76: 27M
o TOTAL under Mao: 70M
* Dictionary of 20C World History: around a half million died in Cultural Rev.
* Eckhardt:
o Govt executes landlords (1950-51): 1,000,000
o Cultural Revolution (1967-68): 50,000
* Gilbert:
o 1958-61 Famine: 30 million deaths.
* Kurt Glaser and Stephan Possony, Victims of Politics (1979):
o They estimate the body count under Mao to be 38,000,000 to 67,000,000.
o Cited by G & P:
+ Walker Report (see below): 44.3M to 63.8M deaths.
+ The Government Information Office of Taiwan (18 Sept. 1970): 37M deaths in the PRC.
+ A Radio Moscow report (7 Apr. 1969): 26.4M people had been exterminated in China.
+ (NOTE: Obviously the Soviets and Taiwanese would, as enemies, be strongly motivated to exaggerate.)
* Guinness Book of World Records:
o Although nowadays they don't come right out and declare Mao to be the Top Dog in the Mass Killings category, earlier editions (such as 1978) did, and they cited sources which are similar, but not identical, to the Glaser & Possony sources:
+ On 7 Apr. 1969 the Soviet government radio reported that 26,300,000 people were killed in China, 1949-65.
+ In April 1971 the cabinet of the government of Taiwan reported 39,940,000 deaths for the years 1949-69.
+ The Walker Report (see below): between 32,2500,000 and 61,700,000.
* Harff and Gurr:
o KMT cadre, rich peasants, landlords (1950-51): 800,000-3,000,000
o Cultural Revolution (1966-75): 400,000-850,000
* John Heidenrich, How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars, and the Concerned Citizen: 27M death toll, incl. 2M in Cultural Revolution
* Paul Johnson doesn't give an overall total, but he gives estimates for the principle individual mass dyings of the Mao years:
o Land reform, first years of PRC: at least 2 million people perished.
o Great Leap Forward: "how many millions died ... is a matter of conjecture."
o Cultural Revolution: 400,000, calling the 3 Feb. 1979 estimate by Agence France Presse, "The most widely respected figure".
* Meisner, Maurice, Mao's China and After (1986), doesn't give an overall total either, but he does give estimates for the three principle mass dyings of the Mao years:
o Terror against the counterrevolutionaries: 2 million people executed during the first three years of the PRC.
o Great Leap Forward: 10-20 million famine-related deaths.
o Cultural Revolution: 400,000, citing a 1979 estimate by Agence France Presse.
* R. J. Rummel:
o Estimate:
+ Democide: 34,361,000 (1949-75)
# The principle episodes being...
* All movements (1949-58): 11,813,000
o incl. Land Reform (1949-53): 4,500,000
* Cult. Rev. (1964-75): 1,613,000
* Forced Labor (1949-75): 15,000,000
* Great Leap Forward (1959-63): 5,680,000 democides
+ War: 3,399,000
+ Famine: 34,500,000
# Great Leap Forward: 27M famine deaths
+ TOTAL: 72,260,000
o Cited in Rummel:
+ Li, Cheng-Chung (Republic of China, 1979): 78.86M direct/indirect deaths.
+ World Anti-Communist League, True Facts of Maoist Tyranny (1971): 64.5M
+ Glaser & Possony: 38 to 67M (see above)
+ Walker Report, 1971 (see below): 31.75M to 58.5M casualties of Communism (excluding Korean War).
+ Current Death Toll of International Communism (1979): 39.9M
+ Stephen R. Shalom (1984), Center for Asian Studies, Deaths in China Due To Communism: 3M to 4M death toll, excluding famine.
* Walker, Robert L., The Human Cost of Communism in China (1971, report to the US Senate Committee of the Judiciary) "Casualties to Communism" (deaths):
o 1st Civil War (1927-36): .25-.5M
o Fighting during Sino-Japanese War (1937-45): 50,000
o 2nd Civil War (1945-49): 1.25M
o Land Reform prior to Liberation: 0.5-1.0M
o Political liquidation campaigns: 15-30M
o Korean War: 0.5-1.234M
o Great Leap Forward: 1-2M
o Struggle with minorities: 0.5-1.0M
o Cultural Revolution: .25-.5M
o Deaths in labor camps: 15-25M
o TOTAL: 34.3M to 63.784M
o TOTAL FOR PRC: 32M to 59.5M
* July 17, 1994, Washington Post (Great Leap Forward 1959-61)
o Shanghai University journal, Society: > 40 million
o Cong Jin: 40 million
o Chen Yizi: 43 million in the famine. 80 million total as a result of Mao's policies.
* Weekly Standard, 29 Sept. 1997, "The Laogai Archipelago" by D. Aikman:
o Between 1949 and 1997, 50M prisoners passed through the labor camps, and 15,000,000 died (citing Harry Wu)
* WHPSI: 1,633,319 political executions and 25,961 deaths from political violence, 1948-77. TOTAL: 1,659,280
* Analysis: If we line up the 14 sources which claim to be complete, the median falls in the 45.75 to 52.5 million range, so you probably can't go wrong picking a final number from this neighborhood. Depending on how you want to count some of the incomplete estimates (such as Becker and Meisner) and whether to count a source twice (or thrice, as with Walker) if it's referenced by two different authorities, you can slide the median up and down the scale by many millions. Keep in mind, however, that official Chinese records are hidden from scrutiny, so most of these numbers are pure guesses. It's pointless to get attached to any one of them, because the real number could easily be half or twice any number here.
* Perhaps a better way of estimating would be to add up the individual components. The medians here are:
o Purges, etc. during the first few years: 2M (10 estimates)
o Great Leap Forward: 31-33M (14 estimates)
o Cultural Revolution: 1M (13 estimates)
o Ethnic Minorities, primarily Tibetans: 750-900T (8 estimates, see below)
o Labor Camps: 20M (5 estimates)
o This produces a total of some 54,750,000 to 56,900,000 deaths. The weak link in this calculation is in the Labor Camp numbers for which we only have 5 estimates.
* Notice that many early body counts (such as Walker) completely miss the famine during the Great Leap Forward, which was largely unknown in the west until around 1980. There are two contradictory ways to assess those early estimates which ignore the famine:
1. "If these are the numbers that they came up with without the famine, imagine how high the true number will be once you add the famine deaths."
2. "Can we trust any of these numbers? After all, if they missed such a huge famine, they can't have known very much about what was going on inside China."
* ... so this line of reasoning will get us nowhere. In fact, the median of the 7 estimate that predate 1980 is 45.7M, which is almost the same as the median of the 7 estimates that post-date 1980 -- 58M. (At this scale, a 12M difference counts as "almost the same".)
8. Tibet (1950 et seq.): 600 000
* Chinese occupation. (For the most part, it's already been included in the numbers above.)
o Free Tibet Campaign [http://www.freetibet.org/info/facts/fact1.html]
+ Tibetans killed by the Chinese since 1950: 1,200,000
+ Died in prisons and labour camps between 1950 and 1984: up to 260,000
+ 1959 Uprising: 430,000 died
# K. in Reprisals: 87,000
o Our Times: 1,200,000
o Courtois: 600,000 - 1,200,000
o Walker, Robert: 500,000-1,000,000 (all ethnic minorities)
o Rummel: 375,000 democides inflicted on etnic minorities
+ ... incl 150,000 Tibetans
o Porter: 100,000 to 150,000.
o Eckhardt:
+ 1950-51 War: 2,000 civ.
+ 1956-59 Revolt: 60,000 civ. + 40,000 mil. = 100,000
o Harff and Gurr: 65,000 Tibetan nationalists, landowners, Buddhists killed, 1959
o Small & Singer say that China lost 40,000 soldiers in Tibet between 1956 and '59.

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since 12 Feb. 2005

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Last updated Nov. 2005

Copyright © 1999-2005 Matthew White

Strong Dollar, Weak Dollar: Foreign Exchange Rates and the U.S. Economy by Tim Schilling

[Strong Dollar, Weak Dollar is one of a series of essays adapted from articles in On Reserve, a newsletter for economic educators published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. The original article was written by Keith Feiler and revised by Tim Schilling.]

How does the dollar's value in other countries help or hinder the U.S. economy?
How can the value of the dollar be both good and bad for Americans at the same time?
What causes the dollar's value in other countries to change?
Where is the international currency market and how does it operate?

Strong is good. Weak is bad. These generalizations sound simple enough, but they can be confusing when talking about money. Is a "strong" U.S. dollar always good? Is a "weak" dollar always bad? This publication explores how the U.S. dollar and foreign currencies affect each other and how their interaction affects you and the economy.

Understanding Foreign Exchange

The terms strong and weak, rising and falling, strengthening and weakening are relative terms in the world of foreign exchange (sometimes referred to as "forex"). Rising and falling, strengthening and weakening all indicate a relative change in position from a previous level. When the dollar is "strengthening," its value is rising in relation to one or more other currencies. A strong dollar will buy more units of a foreign currency than previously. One result of a stronger dollar is that the prices of foreign goods and services drop for U.S. consumers. This may allow Americans to take the long-postponed vacation to another country, or buy a foreign car that used to be too expensive.

U.S. consumers benefit from a strong dollar, but U.S. exporters are hurt. A strong dollar means that it takes more of a foreign currency to buy U.S. dollars. U.S. goods and services become more expensive for foreign consumers who, as a result, tend to buy fewer U.S. products. Because it takes more of a foreign currency to purchase strong dollars, products priced in dollars are more expensive when sold overseas.

Strengthening Dollar
Advantages

• Consumer sees lower prices on foreign products/services.
• Lower prices on foreign products/services help keep inflation low.
• U.S. consumers benefit when they travel to foreign countries.
• U.S. investors can purchase foreign stocks/bonds at "lower" prices.

Disadvantages

• U.S. firms find it harder to compete in foreign markets.
• U.S. firms must compete with lower priced foreign goods.
• Foreign tourists find it more expensive to visit U.S.
• More difficult for foreign investors to provide capital to U.S. in times of heavy U.S. borrowing.

Weakening Dollar
Advantages

• U.S. firms find it easier to sell goods in foreign markets.
• U.S. firms find less competitive pressure to keep prices low.
• More foreign tourists can afford to visit the U.S.
• U.S. capital markets become more attractive to foreign investors.

Disadvantages

• Consumers face higher prices on foreign products/services.
• Higher prices on foreign products contribute to higher cost-of-living.
• U.S. consumers find traveling abroad more costly.
• Harder for U.S. firms and investors to expand into foreign markets.

A weak dollar also hurts some people and benefits others. When the value of the dollar falls or weakens in relation to another currency, prices of goods and services from that country rise for U.S. consumers. It takes more dollars to purchase the same amount of foreign currency to buy goods and services. That means U.S. consumers and U.S. companies that import products have reduced purchasing power.

At the same time, a weak dollar means prices for U.S. products fall in foreign markets, benefiting U.S. exporters and foreign consumers. With a weak dollar, it takes fewer units of foreign currency to buy the right amount of dollars to purchase U.S. goods. As a result, consumers in other countries can buy U.S. products with less money.

Ideally, the dollar and all nations' currencies should be valued at a level that is neither too high nor too low. Such a level would help sustain long-term economic growth and stability both here and abroad. However, this ideal is difficult to reach since many factors affect the value of a nation's money. Some of the factors are complex, but many are quite simple.

The Value of a Currency

The value of a currency can be viewed from a domestic as well as an international perspective. Domestically, we use measures such as the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to measure changes in the purchasing power of the dollar over time. When the CPI increases, we say that the dollar is buying less — the value or purchasing strength of the dollar is going down. If the CPI is relatively stable, we say that the value of the dollar is stable. For some products with falling prices, we can even say that the purchasing power of the dollar is increasing.

Even when the dollar may be stable domestically, the value of the dollar could rise or fall as measured by another country's currency. In those cases, a currency is a commodity. It is something that has a price and is bought and sold to be used. The medium of exchange used to purchase this commodity is the currency of another country. The dollar, in that perspective, is purchased by foreign citizens who will, in turn, use it to purchase U.S. goods and services or dollar-denominated assets such as Treasury securities, corporate or municipal bonds, or stock.

An interesting aspect of foreign exchange is that a currency may be strengthening but still may not be strong relative to its historical position. For example, if the dollar were to rise from 85 yen to the dollar to 88 yen, it is strengthening. However, because the dollar historically is worth more than 100 yen, it is still not "strong." Likewise, a dollar that falls to 175 yen from 185 yen is weakening, but certainly not weak by historical comparison.

Almost every international exchange of goods and services requires the exchange of one currency for another. Less frequently, some countries will barter goods, or settle payments in gold. But most international transactions involve foreign exchange. The individual, firm or government of another country that wants to buy U.S. products needs dollars. This is because the dollar is legal tender in this country and transactions tend to be denominated in dollars.

The dollar, of course, is not the only currency that is bought and sold, but it is among the most popular. Other important currencies include the euro, the Japanese yen and the German deutschmark (sometimes referred to as the d-mark).

The Forex Market

In most cases, the buying and selling of currencies takes place in the forex market. The currencies of most advanced and many developing economies are traded in this market. The forex market does not involve sending large loads of currency from one country to another. Typically it involves electronic balances. Dollar-denominated balances in computers in the U.S. or other countries are traded for computer-housed balances around the world that are denominated in yen, euros, d-marks, or any of dozens of other commonly traded monies. In short, when "currency" is traded, paper and metal are not the usual media of exchange. Foreign exchange exists mainly in the world of cyberspace.

Not all currencies are traded on forex markets. Currencies that are not traded are avoided for reasons ranging from political instability to economic uncertainty. Sometimes a country's currency is not exchanged for the simple reason that the country produces very few products of interest to other countries.

Unlike the commodities or stock markets, the forex market has no central trading floor where buyers and sellers meet. Most of the trades are completed by commercial banks and forex dealers in the U.S. and abroad using telephones and computers.

The forex market operates worldwide, 24 hours a day. Traders in Australia and the Far East begin trading in Hong Kong, Singapore, Tokyo, and Sydney at about the time most workers in San Francisco are going home for supper the previous evening. As the business day in the Far East closes, trading in Middle Eastern financial centers has been going on for a couple of hours, and the trading day in Europe is just beginning. By the time the New York business day gets going in full force, it is almost time for early afternoon tea in London. Some of the large U.S. banks and brokerage houses have an early shift to minimize the time difference of 5 to 6 hours with Europe. To complete the circle, West Coast financial institutions extend "normal banking hours" so they can trade with New York or Europe on one side, and with Hong Kong, Singapore, or Tokyo on the other.

In each case, financial institutions, corporations, or even interested individuals buy and sell money. They use one currency to purchase another. In many cases, they are buying money as part of doing business in the country that issues that currency. But in other cases, firms or individuals may buy one currency in one market to sell it in another and profit from the difference in price. This speculating on price differences is called arbitrage. In an age of virtually instant communication, this is especially challenging because the differences in price may last only a few seconds.

The forex market is distinguished here from the forex futures market, which has several trading floors, principally the International Monetary Market, a division of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. The futures market in forex was developed to help reduce risk for international firms and financial institutions. The market was designed to "guarantee" exchange rates at a future date in order to facilitate international transactions. Prior to the development of forex futures, there could be a significant amount of risk in entering into a long-term contract with firms in other countries. One of the largest sources of risk was the inability to guarantee the relative value of the currencies involved at the date of delivery.

Two is better than one
It is often possible to see two different national currencies accepted in one country. In some foreign countries, the U.S. dollar is the "currency of choice" because individuals have misgivings about the soundness of the domestic currency. In other cases, accepting two currencies depends on location. For example, in areas near the Canadian border, U.S. currency is sometimes fully acceptable in Canadian shops and Canadian currency is used (often at the official exchange rate) in U.S. establishments. But generally speaking, these areas tend to be small and in close proximity to the borders. Usually the decision to accept a foreign currency is made by local establishments as a convenience to border-crossing tourists.

Price Determined by Supply and Demand

The forex market is essentially governed by the law of supply and demand and is generally not regulated by any government or coalition of governments. This is true in the U.S., where participation in the forex market is not regulated. The prices set for each country's money is determined by the desire of those trading to acquire more of it or to hold less of it. Each individual acts on the belief that he or she will benefit from the transaction.

According to the law of supply, as prices rise for a given item (in this case money), the quantity of the item that is supplied will increase; conversely, as the price falls, the quantity provided will fall. The law of demand states that as the price for an item rises, the quantity demanded will fall. As the price for an item falls, the quantity demanded will rise. It is the interaction of these basic forces that results in the movement of currency prices in the forex market.

For example, if French investors saw an opportunity in the U.S., they might be willing to pay more francs in order to get dollars to invest in the U.S. If the dollar moved from five francs per dollar to six francs per dollar, the dollar "strengthened against the franc." In other words, a dollar could buy more francs. We could also state the same movement in francs. In the example above, the franc would move from 20¢ per franc to approximately 16¢ per franc. The franc "weakened against the dollar" because a franc could buy fewer dollars.

How do changes in a currency's value affect a country's domestic economy? To show the effects, we can look at the U.S. economy during the 1990s. The dollar was quite strong in relation to other currencies during most of that period. Dollars were in high demand for a number of reasons. Among these was the desire of foreign citizens to buy U.S. financial securities such as Treasury notes and bonds, corporate bonds, and other U.S. assets. Part of the reason for this was the general attractiveness of U.S. government securities; another was because U.S. financial markets were booming through much of the period.

Factors Contributing to a Strong Currency

• Higher interest rates in home country than abroad
• Lower rates of inflation
• A domestic trade surplus relative to other countries
• A large, consistent government deficit crowding out domestic borrowing
• Political or military unrest in other countries
• A strong domestic financial market
• Strong domestic economy/weaker foreign economies
• No record of default on government debt
• Sound monetary policy aimed at price stability.

Factors Contributing to a Weak Currency

• Lower interest rates in home country than abroad
• Higher rates of inflation
• A domestic trade deficit relative to other countries
• A consistent government surplus
• Relative political/military stability in other countries
• A collapsing domestic financial market
• Weak domestic economy/stronger foreign economies
• Frequent or recent default on government debt
• Monetary policy that frequently changes objectives.

Many sectors of the U.S. economy were borrowing heavily during this period. Government, corporations, and individuals were relying on credit. This created strong demand for money to lend to borrowers. Typically, money saved by consumers is used to help meet such demand. Unfortunately, savings rates in the U.S. were low. Consequently, the money for U.S. borrowing had to come from somewhere. Funds from abroad helped to meet the demand. This rise in demand increased the price of dollars relative to other currencies. This, in turn, made it more attractive for investors to hold dollars.

At the same time, the Federal Reserve kept inflation under control. This made the dollar attractive because of its stability. These trends combined to raise the cost of the dollar for foreign investors. The relatively high rates of return in U.S. financial markets enabled investors to earn better profits than could be found in their own financial markets. The increased demand for U.S. investments helped to make the dollar stronger. In addition to attractive rates, foreigners were eager to invest in the United States because this country was, and still is, seen as a comparatively stable, safe haven where investments are secure.

Effects on an Economy

The decisions of citizens to invest in another country can have a significant effect on their domestic economy. In the case of the U.S., the desire of foreign investors to hold dollar-denominated assets helped finance the U.S. government's large budget deficit and supplied funds to private credit markets. According to the laws of supply and demand, an increased supply of funds — in this case funds provided by other countries — tends to lower the price of those funds. The price of funds is the interest rate. The increase in the supply of funds extended by foreign investors helped finance the budget deficit and helped keep interest rates below what they would have been without foreign capital.

The rising demand for dollar-denominated assets also had a negative effect on the U.S. economy. The stronger dollar increased the attractiveness of foreign goods in the U.S. Many price-conscious U.S. consumers responded by purchasing more imports and fewer domestic goods. This did help keep inflation under control. But at the same time, U.S. exports were more expensive to foreigners who tended to buy fewer U.S. goods. As a result, the trade deficit widened as U.S. exports decreased and U.S. imports increased.

When a currency becomes too strong or too weak, it tends to distort international competition. As we have seen, the strong dollar of the 1990s distorted the competitiveness of U.S. producers in relation to foreign producers. Even though foreign producers may not have used their resources as efficiently as their U.S. counterparts, they still might have been able to sell their products at lower prices than U.S. goods.

Many U.S. companies responded to this increased competition by streamlining their processes and increasing productivity. In the long run, increased productivity benefited these companies and the U.S. economy. However, some producers could not make sufficient adjustments and found that their products could not compete in either U.S. or international markets.

In reaction, many of those hurt by foreign imports called for government assistance to limit foreign competition. This assistance came in the form of tariffs, quotas, subsidies and embargoes. This sentiment of protectionism is potentially one of the most harmful outgrowths of changes in the relative strengths of currencies. If one government passes laws setting up protective barriers, other countries would likely retaliate with protective measures of their own. International trade would slow, and people in all nations would then lose the benefits of better quality, lower prices, and a broader selection of products.

A Different Lesson from the '90s

The reason a currency weakens may not have much to do with problems in that country's economy. Sometimes, a currency weakens simply because of external factors. While most of the 1990s saw a strong U.S. dollar, the U.S faced a different situation briefly during the middle of the decade.

During the autumn of 1995, the U.S. dollar began to weaken significantly against both the Japanese yen and the German d-mark. The U.S. economy was still recovering from the 1990-91 recession, although many were concerned about the weakness of the recovery. When the dollar began to fall, this increased investors' and consumers' concern about the strength of the recovery. There were even calls for the Treasury to direct the Federal Reserve to buy dollars and sell yen and d-marks in an attempt to strengthen the dollar.

However, the dollar was not falling because the U.S. economy was weak. Rather, the rising value of the other currencies reflected improving economic conditions within those countries. In Germany, the continued reunification of East and West, while presenting problems, was viewed as an opportunity to reach a large population that previously had not had access to Western goods and services. High interest rates in the reunified Germany were also an attraction to investors.

A different scenario was unfolding in Japan. Despite low interest rates, deflation was actually making "real" Japanese interest rates fairly attractive. Real interest rates are usually calculated by subtracting the rate of inflation from the interest rate quoted. Thus, a 4 percent interest rate in an economy with 3 percent inflation converts to a real rate of interest of only 1 percent (4 percent - 3 percent = 1 percent). Negative inflation (commonly called deflation) essentially adds that rate to the market interest rate. An interest rate of 2 percent in an economy with 3 percent deflation yields a real rate of interest of 5 percent.

Thus, the reason the dollar "weakened" during the fall of 1995 had less to do with weakness in the U.S. economy than with positive opportunities in the economies of Germany and Japan.

Stable Dollar

A strong currency can have both a positive and a negative impact on a nation's economy. The same holds true for a weak currency. Currencies that are too strong or too weak not only affect individual economies, but tend to distort international trade and economic and political decisions worldwide. This is compounded by the fact that individual consumers can benefit from changes in the value of a currency, while producers in the same country are hurt. But the value of a currency alone does not dictate trade flows. Many other factors are involved, such as the quality of the product. Nevertheless, changes in currency values can have a dramatic effect. Ideally, currency values should be relatively stable and at a level that can sustain long-term economic growth both here and abroad.

Bretton Woods and Fixed Rates
If shifts in exchange rates can cause problems, why not fix rates between countries? Under a fixed-rate system, a dollar would always be worth the same amount of pounds, lira, yen or d-marks. This idea is not new. Through most of the modern era the world was on a fixed-rate system. The most recent version is referred to as the Bretton Woods System.

In 1944, the industrialized countries of the world met in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to discuss the state of the international economy in the post-WW II era. The heart of the discussion evolved around a plan to fix the rate of exchange for all foreign currencies to the U.S. dollar. The dollar would, in turn, be tied to gold for purposes of international settlement at a set price. This meant that a pound, lira, yen, etc., would always yield a fixed number of dollars. And an ounce of gold would always cost a set number of dollars.

The hope was that the U.S. dollar would provide stability for international trade. This stability would, in turn, translate to a solid base upon which the war-torn economies of Europe and Asia could rebuild. One disadvantage of this system was that participating nations would need to take actions that would affect their domestic economy — such as increasing or decreasing the money supply — in order to maintain their exchange rate.

The Bretton Woods Agreement, as it came to be called, started to unravel in the early 1960s. The U.S. had enjoyed a period of prosperity for most of the period since the end of World War II. Because the U.S. dollar was not convertible to gold domestically, but was considered "as good as gold" internationally, the growing U.S. economy (and money supply) meant that excess dollars easily found their way overseas.

But, in order to maintain the value of their currencies relative to the dollar, other countries had to expand their money supplies just as quickly in order to maintain the agreed upon ratios of foreign currencies to dollars. This increase in foreign currencies introduced higher inflation to those nations. The U.S. was, in essence, exporting inflation.

By the late 1960s, the now resurgent countries of Europe and Asia recognized one of the sources of their inflation problems. They were reluctant to increase their domestic money supply to keep pace with the U.S., so they began to return excess dollars, demanding gold in payment at the agreed-upon rate of exchange. This led to an outflow of gold from the U.S. Eventually the U.S. holdings of gold became dangerously low. By 1971, President Nixon was forced to close the "gold window" by no longer exchanging dollars for gold at the agreed-upon rate. Since that time, exchange rates have been allowed to "float," with rates determined by the supply of and demand for currencies.

Notes

Strong Dollar, Weak Dollar is one of a series of essays adapted from articles in On Reserve, a newsletter for economic educators published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. The original article was written by Keith Feiler and revised by Tim Schilling.

The Effect of Sexual Deprivation on Women By Henry Makow Ph.D.

(Reader's Note: This summer I am reprising and revising some articles that predated my web site.)

We live in a culture that doesn't admit that women need sex every bit as much as men, if not more.

Conservatives like to put women on a romantic pedestal. Women are virginal and sexless. Feminists deny women need men for anything.

"Women are made to feel guilty for needing men," my wife said. "We're told we're weak, co-dependent or lacking in self-esteem."

My 15-year-old son has also inculcated this message from TV: "Women don't need sex," he said. "They're just doing men a favor."

Sex and love have become horribly confused. When religion held sway, they were inseparable (i.e. marriage.)

But today "sexual liberation" has freed sex from love. It has taken love's place. Millions of men and women behave like addicts. They use sex to assuage a desperate craving for love that only it can satisfy.

DESPERATELY SEEKING LOVE

An "independent" movie, "The Business of Strangers" explores the effect feminism has had on modern women. Writer/director Patrick Stettner illustrates how American women have traded love for the sterility, banality and inhumanity of corporate culture.

Two women are stranded overnight at an airport hotel while on a sale trip. Stockard Channing plays "Julie Styron," successful divorced 45-ish VP sales whose best friend is her secretary.

Julia Stiles plays Paula Murphy, a tough 25-ish "writer" who works the overhead.

The movie shows how career has supplanted family for women like Styron. Feminism promised that women could have both, but this did not work out.

Forty seven per cent of 40-something women with professional degrees have no children. Only 14% of these women said they didn't want children. ("Creating a Life: Professional Life and the Quest for Children" by Sylvia Ann Hewitt)

Styron is fired without warning. But she is oddly indifferent when she immediately lands an even better job as a CEO.

ODE TO WASTE & FRUSTRATION

In the hotel bar with Styron, Murphy recognizes Nick Harris a slick young corporate head-hunter. He is the man who raped her best friend years ago at a frat party. She lures him to Styron's suite and puts tranquilizers in his drink.

After he passes out, the two women indulge in an orgy of hatred over his unconscious body. They undress him, cover him with obscene graffiti, smear blood and strike him. Both women clearly despise men. Murphy confides it was actually she who suffered the rape.

However, it emerges later that Nick is a rapist in her mind only. Styron learns that he had never been to the city where the rape supposedly took place.

Men are "rapists" because they are not giving women the love they need. The result is self-loathing and resentment against men. Feminism first makes women and men incompatible; then it exploits women's frustration and rage.

"WHAT DOES WOMAN WANT?"

Freud was unable to answer this question despite "thirty years of research into the feminine soul."

Chaucer's "Wife of Bath" knew the answer: Woman wants to be loved. She'll do anything for love, even if it means becoming a feminist.

Many Western women today are dysfunctional because they are getting contradictory messages. Society tells them to be "strong and independent," i.e. successful in a career.

But this behaviour is masculine and makes men feel redundant. Men don't like these women. Thus women are doing what society tells them to do, yet they are not getting the male love they expect and need.

Women are loved when they put their husband and children before themselves. It is feminine to self efface. Men love these women because they become part of them.

I am not against a woman having a career, only putting it before marriage and family.

GETTING DATING STRAIGHT

A single friend characterized a typical date this way. He describes his work and seeks affirmation and respect. She describes her work and seeks affirmation and respect from him. They never see each other again. (They are already competing.)

This is NOT how heterosexuals mate. Women are hypergamous, which means they seek men of higher power and status. Nurses marry doctors.

On a date, a man reveals himself and his vision of life. She decides if she's interested in him or not. If she is, she affirms him by her acceptance and encouragement. In marriage, she demonstrates her love by trusting him to take care of her interests.

He also affirms her by seeking her acceptance. Yes, he also wants her to be capable and successful. But his recognition and nurturing come later.

All successful organizations are hierarchical. The heterosexual family is male dominated. If you wanted to destroy it, you promote equality. Our culture is doing this.

THE FEMINIST TRAP

It is mind-boggling but our politicians, media and educators are deliberately sabotaging society. Feminism like its Communist forebear dogmatically denies human sexual differences, such as the fact that men have 10 times the testosterone levels of women.

There are over 900 Women's Studies Programs in the United States teaching impressionable young women to deny their femininity. According to "Issues in Feminism: An Introduction to Women's Studies" femininity is "patriarchal mind control." The "best slaves are the ones who don't even know they are slaves." Who authorized this indoctrination in lesbian dysfunction?

This vicious state-sponsored hoax is ruining millions of lives. The CIA and the Rockefeller Foundation sponsor it. The superrich use tax-exempt foundations to promote Communism, according to the 1954 Reese Committee Report of the U.S. Congress. http://www.biblebelievers.org.au/reeceart.htm

Feminism is another manifestation of Communism, which was always sponsored by the international bankers and their corporate allies. Their goal is to transfer all power to a global state, which they control. By harnessing the authoritarian power of the state, Big Brother will serve Big Business.

The stated goal of the Communist Manifesto is to destroy the nuclear family. People without stable families are easy to distract and control. Sex starved, isolated, and dysfunctional, the few children they have are also messed up. Last week, we learned that the U.S. birth rate is at the lowest point in history.

WOMAN THE MULTIPLIER (MAN X WOMAN = CHILDREN)

A woman's elaborate reproductive apparatus has a profound influence on her psyche. Each month she produces an egg and she is devoted to seeing that egg fertilized, giving birth and raising a child.

On the other hand, a woman is the fertile ground for a man's spirit to grow. First she accepts his spirit. Then she accepts his seed, from which a child grows.

Men need to be lovingly received and affirmed. Women need to be possessed and cultivated. This is wholeness. Their child symbolizes it.

When this connection is stymied, we have arrested development. Many women become angry and psychotic like Styron and Murphy. Men have become detached and selfish. Both are obsessed with sex.

The media makes women appear like remote goddesses but they are passionate sexual creatures that need committed love and direction from a man.

In a true marriage, two people become one. Each complements the other. Women's strengths should not be the same as men's and vice versa.

Independence is the big issue in feminist marriages. They are mergers, a pooling of assets to achieve economic and sexual synergies. The two people fail to bond and remain immature. They struggle for power and break up.

CONCLUSION

Heterosexual society has been under sustained psychological attack designed to arrest human development and decrease population. Feminism is the weapon of choice. It encourages women to deny their femininity and act like men.

Feminine women are characterized by selflessness. They are not hunters. They are not killers. They are a little vulnerable in a worldly sense. How do men respond to them? By wanting to nurture and protect them. This is how men love. This is what women want.

In "The Business of Strangers" both women have become hunters. As a result, they hate men but worse they hate themselves. Victims of a diabolical plot, they have mutated. They need a man's love in order to be themselves again.

Henry Makow, is the inventor of the board game Scruples, and the author of A Long Way to go for a Date. He received his Ph.D. in English Literature from the University of Toronto. He welcomes your feedback and ideas at henry@savethemales.ca.